Framework
What is Platform Sovereignty?
Platform sovereignty describes the condition in which a private platform acquires practical governing power over an essential function because exit becomes difficult, slow, or institutionally costly.
Tag
23 items across the journal, including 19 research pages and 4 cases.
Framework
Platform sovereignty describes the condition in which a private platform acquires practical governing power over an essential function because exit becomes difficult, slow, or institutionally costly.
Framework
The FCPI Index is a framework for measuring when a platform, infrastructure layer, or service becomes a finality-bearing choke point with strategic consequences.
Framework
A comparative method for identifying when control over a platform, infrastructure layer, or service becomes control over completion — the point at which dependency becomes leverage.
Framework
The indispensability threshold is crossed when replacing or bypassing a system ceases to be a normal procurement choice and becomes a strategic disruption.
Framework
FCPI is a formal method, but this journal presents it in a public-facing score format so cases can be read quickly and compared consistently.
Paper
Scam centres persist not because enforcement fails, but because disruption never reaches the real choke points: labour control, payment rails, and jurisdictional protection.
Framework
A structured application of the Finality Choke Point Index to scam-centre ecosystems, identifying where control over coercive outcomes actually sits across seven dimensions.
Framework
Two mechanisms that stabilise coercive infrastructure by making it physically unreachable and analytically invisible — and what the FCPI framework reveals about both.
Paper
By the time a coercive system has a settled regulatory label, the underlying power shift has often already happened. Why institutions systematically miss the transition.
Framework
Distributed coercion describes a condition in which the ability to intimidate, compel, disrupt, or physically harm others becomes modular, networked, and purchasable — and why existing security frameworks systematically under-read the shift.
Paper
The Gulf combines high-value targets, dense infrastructure exposure, maritime vulnerability, and strong incentives for adversaries to operate at distance. It is a place where cheap coercion can produce expensive consequences.
Paper
The language of cybercrime often misses the way criminal activity now operates through mainstream commercial infrastructure rather than outside it.
Paper
A platform can look neutral while it is still optional. Once dependence deepens, neutrality gives way to governance.
Paper
This paper examines why civil registration and whitelisting regimes cannot contain adversarial use of commercial LEO connectivity once that connectivity becomes indispensable for unmanned maritime operations — and why the UK is approaching the same threshold seen in Ukraine.
Paper
Civil governance models still treat satellite connectivity as a consumer product. Ukraine's experience shows why that fails — and why the UK is on the same trajectory.
Paper
A chronological case study tracing how expendable unmanned craft, commercial LEO connectivity and governance responses evolved from early innovation to the point at which the United Kingdom must decide whether to act.
Paper
A chronological case study tracing how Starlink crossed the indispensability threshold in Ukraine — from emergency activation in February 2022 to governance fragmentation and institutional separation by 2025.
Paper
Analysis of how Starlink became mission-critical infrastructure in Ukraine, why neutrality collapses under coercive dependency, and how Starshield represents institutional separation.
Paper
Most commentary on Starlink in Ukraine treats the story as a drama about personality or corporate politics. The deeper issue is structural: a privately governed platform became indispensable inside a coercive system but was still governed as a platform. Once that happened, neutrality stopped being stable.
Case · high
A structural comparison of two scam centre models — compound coercion in Southeast Asia and office coercion in Eastern Europe — through the FCPI framework.
Case · high
Analysis of foundation model providers as high-FCPI infrastructure layers, and how AI model dependency creates sovereignty, continuity, and control risks.
Case · high
Analysis of AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud as high-FCPI infrastructure layers, and how cloud dependency creates sovereignty and control risks.
Case · high
Model access layers can become strategically consequential when institutions depend on them for cognition, workflow acceleration, and system coordination.